090306] proposed a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication protocol. We find that the proposed protocol is not secure, that is, Charlie can eavesdrop the shared keys between Alice and Bob without being detected. , we also see that they claimed that the proposed CMQEA protocol was secure after two possible attacks, the internal attack and the external attack, were discussed. However, this is not a fact. In the Comment, we will show that the center, Charlie may eavesdrop the keys of an authentication party without introducing any error, that is, we will prove that Kang et al.'s CMQEA protocol is not secure.
Recently, using GHZ-like states and entanglement swapping, Kang et al. proposed a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication (CMQEA) protocol [1] , in which there are three participants: Charlie, Alice and Bob. Both Alice and Bob are authentication parties, and Charlie acts as a center, similar to a telephone company, a server, etc. Although he can control all of the mutual authentication phases, Charlie is forbidden to obtain any secret message of authentication parties. Reviewing previous papers [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , we see that the center, the telephone company or the server, etc. in them are similarly forbidden in that aspect. In Kang et al.'s CMQEA protocol [1] , we also see that they claimed that the proposed CMQEA protocol was secure after two possible attacks, the internal attack and the external attack, were discussed. However, this is not a fact. In the Comment, we will show that the center, Charlie may eavesdrop the keys of an authentication party without introducing any error, that is, we will prove that Kang et al.'s CMQEA protocol is not secure.
Next, we start to describe Charlie's eavesdropping strategy in detail, and when describing, please refer to the phases of implementing Kang et al.'s CMQEA protocol (or Section 4 in the paper [1] ) for the clarity.
In the P2 phase, before Charlie sends the sequences including decoy qubits to Alice and Bob, he performs σ z basis measurements on qubit C 2i−1 and qubit C 2i , and Bell basis measurements on qubits A 2i−1 , A 2i and qubits B 2i−1 , B 2i (here the subscript 2i-1 and 2i designate the order of GHZ-like state in the sequence also).
Since relying on decoy qubits to check the security, this action that Charlie performs these measurements ahead of schedule will not be detected by Alice and Bob in the S1 and S2 phases. Therefore, when the E1 phase goes on, if Charlie chooses Alice, obviously, she doesn't apply the Pauli operator on GHZ-like states, but Bell states now. But, Alice doesn't know this at all. When the E3 phase starts, as soon as Alice announces her measurement outcome a 2i−1 a 2i , Charlie will easily obtain Alice's Pauli operator, that is, her * Corresponding author. E-mail: gaogan0556@163.com keys. Later on, Charlie is required to reveal the measurement outcome of classical bit c 2i−1 c 2i , and he may directly announce the previously obtaining outcomes. 
